hap.random: a new random number library for D

[Chris Cain via Digitalmars-d-announce]

On Wednesday, 11 June 2014 at 16:35:31 UTC, Kagamin wrote:
> In some scenarios impredictability is not enough. For example, 
> when you generate a session id, an attacker doesn't have to 
> predict it ahead of time, he can guess it at any time later. 
> And if they listen to radio waves - that's an "open protocol", 
> an attacker can setup antenna near their antenna and get the 
> same readings. Cryptographic PRNG and quantum TRNG are better 
> isolated, so it's harder to read them.

That's an interesting thought on a potential attack. I wouldn't 
say "same readings" but similar readings is possible and might 
make attacks easier.

It might not be a bad idea as part of a solution though, since it 
can be used to supplement other sources of local-machine 
crypto-grade entropy (since often such sources are exhaustible). 
But yes, just straight up using it alone appears to have a few 
critical problems.