If you needed any more evidence that memory safety is the future...

Moritz Maxeiner via Digitalmars-d digitalmars-d at puremagic.com
Fri Mar 3 09:33:14 PST 2017

On Friday, 3 March 2017 at 16:43:05 UTC, Kagamin wrote:
> On Friday, 24 February 2017 at 19:19:57 UTC, Moritz Maxeiner 
> wrote:
>> *Then* you have to provide conclusive (or at the very least 
>> hard to refute) proof that the reason that no one could break 
>> them were the memory safety features; and then, *finally*, you 
>> can point to all the people *still not using memory safe 
>> languages* and say "Told you so".
> Such proof is impossible because correct programs can be 
> written in unsafe languages.

And you can write memory incorrect programs in what's currently 
called memory safe languages[1], which is we need more programs 
in such languages to reach a reasonable sample size for 
comparison and analysis against programs in classic languages 
such as C/C++.
A formal, mathematical proof is impossible, yes, but if you have 
a large enough sample size of programs in a memory safe(r) 
language, *and* can verify that they are indeed memory correct 
(and thus not open to all the usual attack vectors), then that 
falls what I'd categorize under "hard to refute". But you're 
right, I should've been more specific, my bad.


More information about the Digitalmars-d mailing list