[OT] “Raise the nose, HAL.” “I’m sorry, Dave, I’m afraid I can’t do that.”

[Paolo Invernizzi]

On Sunday, 21 April 2019 at 21:05:43 UTC, Walter Bright wrote:
> On 4/21/2019 1:45 PM, Paolo Invernizzi wrote:

>> I'm not interested in the specific case. What I'm wondering is 
>> if software is still not so under the lens of regulation as 
>> hardware of mechanical engineering in general, so that's a 
>> "trend" in shifting "weight" from traditional engineering to 
>> software engineering, and that's starting to be a problem.
>
> There's been constant upheaval in aircraft systems since the 
> very beginning. There's not really any such thing as 
> "traditional". For example, the switch from cable operated 
> surfaces to hydraulic boost to fully powered surfaces. The 
> pilot moving the surfaces directly was abandoned with the 747, 
> for obvious reasons.

That's my point, that's not software engineering... and the 
evolution worked well!

> It's important to realize that the MCAS problems were not due 
> to bugs in the software implementation. It was bugs in the 
> design specification. The spec seems to contradict principles 
> of aircraft design which Boeing holds dear, and I cannot 
> explain how such a design got approved.

Again, that's the point! It does not resemble you all the 
discussion in the forum around the meaning of "assert", 
recovering from UB, catching errors, and so? I'm full on your 
boat!

So the question: are there so many people leaving that boat? And 
I'm talking about design and implementation. I think mechanical 
engineering is still "sane" in that respect...

> Cost savings do not explain it at all.

Au contraire, costs are floading inside a company from holes that 
not anybody knows, if does not have the proper information... 
don't exclude that...