Typical security issues in C++: why the GC isn't your enemy

[Siarhei Siamashka]

On Thursday, 15 December 2022 at 14:36:18 UTC, H. S. Teoh wrote:
> +1, I have always been skeptical about the contemporary trend 
> of using fancy package managers with hairball external 
> dependencies that make your builds dependent on some opaque 
> remote server somewhere out there on the 'Net that you have no 
> control over.  Some time ago somebody also posted another 
> article about how easy it is to conduct MITM attacks on these 
> external package repositories to insert a malicious package / 
> substitute a legitimate package with a malicious version.
>
> Not only it's a security hazard, it's also a logistic 
> time-bomb: you never know if the remote server won't suddenly 
> vanish off the face of the internet right at the moment when 
> you're about to release your product and need to make the final 
> production build. (It may come back tomorrow or the day after, 
> but deadlines would be missed, heads would roll.)  You're 
> basically putting yourself at the mercy (and/or (in)competence) 
> of some independent external entity you have zero control or 
> influence over.

Any serious organization relying on DUB packages would have their 
own local mirror of this stuff and also pin all dependencies to 
specific commit hashes rather than version tags (after reviewing 
the code, checking digital signatures, etc.).

It's also possible to use the compilers and libraries packaged in 
some reputable Linux distribution. Albeit the compiler versions 
will be somewhat stale and the variety of the available 
third-party libraries will be somewhat limited.