RFC: Change what assert does on error

[Walter Bright]

On 7/3/2025 1:25 AM, Richard (Rikki) Andrew Cattermole wrote:
>>  From what I can tell this kind of attack is unlikely in D even without the 
> codegen protection. So once again, the Error class hierarchy offers no 
> protection from this kind of attack.

The paper says that exception unwinding of the stack is still vulnerable to 
malware attack.


> Need more evidence to suggest that Error shouldn't offer cleanup. Right now I 
> have none.

Because:

1. there is no purpose to the cleanup as the process is to be terminated

2. code that is not executed is not vulnerable to attack

3. the more code that is executed after the program entered unknown and 
unanticipated territory, the more likely it will corrupt something that matters

Do you really want cleanup code to be updating your data files after the program 
has corrupted its data structures?

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This whole discussion seems pointless anyway. If you want to unwind the 
exception stack every time, use enforce(), not assert(). That's what it's for.