SHA-3 is KECCAK

[Kagamin]

On Saturday, 18 January 2014 at 15:17:52 UTC, Chris Cain wrote:
> You're correct. It was an example of a collision attack which 
> means they can put up a single hash and it will match many 
> possible documents that include all the names of the candidates.

Consequence of a 2-document collision is big enough, that a 
12-document collision doesn't pose any notably bigger threat. 
Nostradamus is all they could come up with, which is laughable. 
If they upgrade this to an actual partial 3.6-bit preimage 
attack, and one collision takes 2 days as they say, for a 
comparison, with such partial preimage attack, full preimage 
attack on a 32-bit hash like crc32 will take 2^^(32-3.6)*2 days = 
1959870 years in an ideal case.

> If you had _read_ the source, you may have understood that. In 
> fact, if you have read anything on cryptography at all before, 
> you'd be staying away from MD5, but ignorance is bliss I 
> suppose.

Isn't it you, who insist on ignorance to how a collision attack 
works and how it doesn't work? You insist on a magical approach 
to cryptography, that MD5 magic doesn't work and SHA3 magic 
works, but you should know that magic is a delusion, and delusion 
leads to failures and damage, so by spreading delusions, it's you 
who cause damage, not me.